…“Bitter conflicts over wage differentials, a hodgepodge of subdivisional judgments regarding the proper price of coal, blatant disregard for the code proscription against selling under a fair market price, and the widespread disregard of the other injunctions against unfair trade practices produced a chaotic price structure….”
“Each price classification included several individual pries based upon the physical structure, chemical analysis, and use-value of a specific type of coal, thus generating a number of prices–at least 400,000–far beyond the ability of a decentralized code to administer.”
“The fragile structure of the coal code buckled under the weight of inordinate administrative complexity and the persistent assaults of critics within and without the industry.”
– John Clark, Energy and the Federal Government: Fossil Fuel Policies, 1900–1946. University of Illinois Press: 1987, pp. 266–27.
…“Despite over 400 prosecutions on over 1,800 reported infractions, effective enforcement for service stations was never achieved. For every disputed violation there was a hundred more, and federal judges were as inclined to dismiss code violations as they were to side with the government.”
“[One case] concerned the Babe Ruth Contest held by Jersey Standard in 18 states. With extensive advertising featuring Ruth himself, coupons were dispensed at Esso stations redeemable by children 18 and under for free baseball equipment and grand prizes of a trip to Yankee spring training. Although highly popular with motorists, federal authorities asked Jersey to drop the campaign. The company refused, and a suit was filed on January 15, 1934, to enjoin the contest as in violation of rules 16 and 17 of the NRA code.
“No matter how elaborate may be the statistical technique employed, no matter how conscientious and fair-minded may be those who apply it, no matter how zealous may be the endeavor to conceal its naked arbitrariness by such descriptive terms as `scientific,’ `legitimate,’ or `equitable,’ there is no escape from arbitrariness in [federal] quota fixing [for oil refiners].”
– Myron Watkins Oil: Stabilization or Conservation? New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937, p. 97.
Part I yesterday on the real New Deal centered FDR’s edicts on US crude oil production. (The natural gas industry was in its infancy.) Part II today, taken from Chapter 19 of my Oil, Gas, and Government: The US Experience, looks at the petroleum refining industry. (Part III tomorrow examines oil retailing.)
The major takeaway is that the beloved New Deal of the Progressive Left, and currently in vogue re the Green Energy New Deal, was marked by rampant business/government cronyism at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.…