This continues my three-part review of Andrew Dessler’s primer on the physical science and political economy of climate change, Introduction to Modern Climate Change (2nd edition: 2016).

Part I, “Suggestions for More Interdisciplinary Scholarship, Less Advocacy,” brought attention to the uneven treatment of issues in science, economics, and public policy that tainted the primer. I questioned the Deep Ecology assumption of optimal nature, wherein, according to Dessler, “any change in climate, either warming or cooling, will result in overall negative outcomes for human society” (p. 146).

This seems exactly wrong in our interglacial period when climate-related fatalities have fallen dramatically and agricultural production has soared thanks to warmth but particularly to fossil-fueled capitalism. Incentives and wealth have proven more than a match for the vicissitudes of weather and climate. As Alex Epstein (The Moral Case for Fossil Fuels, pp.…

“This is not an advocacy book…. (p. xi)

“[T]he single most important thing you can do is become politically active … and vote for politicians who support action on climate.” (p. 245)

In the Acknowledgements of Enron Ascending: The Forgotten Years (2018), I co-dedicated the book to a scholar and friend who crossed disciplines to advance our understanding of the real world. His intellectual trespassing benefited from diligence and fairness. I wrote: “Donald Lavoie taught me the value of scholarship in which opposing views are deeply understood, charitably interpreted, and thoroughly evaluated.”

This brings me to Andrew Dessler’s Introduction to Modern Climate Change (2nd edition: 2016, 3rd ed. in process). While this book is well organized, clearly written, and full of settled physical science, it fails the Lavoie Standard in the areas of unsettled climatology, history, and political economy.…

“We have done extensive polling on a carbon tax. It all sucks.”

– John Podesta (Clinton campaign manager), January 2015.

“[A carbon tax is] lethal in the general [election], so I don’t want to support one.”

– Robby Mook (Clinton campaign manager), June 2015.

Hillary Clinton’s campaign would not touch it. Neither would be Democratic Platform in 2016. “[Hillary] Clinton has no intention of being suckered into a political disaster by advocating a carbon tax,” stated Democrat consultant
Paul Bledsoe in July 2016.

If Republicans will come out for it and vote for it, that’s a different matter. But until that happens, the Democrats should have nothing to do with it, because it’s political poison.” –

So if attention-hungry, anti-Trump Republicans (such as Mitt Romney) want to make a carbon tax an issue, be careful.…

[Editor Note: Robert Murphy’s 2009 views on the Andrew Weitzman “fat tails” argument for pricing carbon dioxide were presented yesterday. Today’s post shares Murphy’s review in 2016 of the same issue, part of his coauthored Policy Analysis (No. 801), “The Case Against a U.S. Carbon Tax,” with Patrick Michaels and Paul Knappenberger. ]

“Who would buy such an insurance policy?”

“Fat Tails” and Carbon Taxes as Insurance?

We note that the leaders in the pro-carbon tax camp are abandoning traditional cost-benefit analysis, claiming its use is inappropriate in the context of climate change. One reason given for this is concern over “fat tails”—concern that climate change could result in damages far greater than what is currently considered likely. Worries about fat tails lead some carbon tax proponents, like Harvard economist Martin Weitzman, to argue that, instead of treating a carbon tax as a policy response to a given (and known) negative externality, it should be considered a form of insurance pertaining to a catastrophe that might happen but with unknown likelihood.…