“Regulation did not originate as a goodwill gesture from enlightened attorneys who wanted to spread their notions of the public interest…. It emerged in its current shape largely as a way to enforce Samuel Insull’s efforts to protect his empire from competition for the long term….”

Attorney and author Scott Hempling makes his living testifying before regulatory commissions, often on behalf of public interest and consumer groups. He is the author of “Certifying Regulatory Professionals:  Why Not?” recently posted on ElectricityPolicy.com, (Part I here; Part II here), from which I quote below.

Hempling’s argument is straightforward.  Today, policy and technology are always in flux, which changes the boundary between efficient and inefficient practices. People should know more. Things would surely be better if only regulation were driven by both facts and expertise, an “independent force that aligns interests of the regulated with the public interest.”…

“Forced use of higher-cost U.S.-flag vessels has benefitted domestic water carrier firms, shipbuilding companies, and associated labor. This advantage, however, has been diluted because inflated shipping costs has reduced the attractiveness of barge and tanker transport compared to other alternatives.”

The current debate over legalization of oil exports is intertwined with cabotage (water vessel) protectionism. The previous two posts (Part I; Part II) examined the history of oil-export regulation by the federal government; this post surveys water-vessel restrictions from Washington, D.C., that directly or indirectly impact the oil trade.

In 1808 and 1817, the United States passed legislation reserving coastwise and intercoastal trade to U.S.-built and registered vessels. [1] Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly known as the Jones Act, reaffirmed this policy and extended it to the noncontiguous U.S.…

“The time has come to end the long debate over national energy policy in the United States and to put ourselves solidly on the road to energy independence. … This bill is only the beginning.”

– President Gerald Ford, December 22, 1975, upon signing the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 into law.

With oil shortages in the 1970s, exports of domestic oil became of acute political interest. Regulation was accomplished under two laws: the Export Administration Act of 1973 and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. The rise of Alaskan North Slope Oil, in addition, inspired specific export regulation that not only reflected concerns about domestic supply but special privilege for United States shipping interests. [1]

Export Administration Act

With first sales of crude and product transactions in U.S. …

As the long history of import regulation suggests (The U.S. was a net exporter until the post-World War II period), governmental concern over petroleum exports has been relatively infrequent.  Exports generally have been welcomed to market abundant domestic supply.

There have been exceptions, however.  In wartime, domestic supply has been licensed to guide its distribution in channels deemed proper by authorities; in peacetime, export control has been part of a wider regulatory purpose.

World War I

In World War I, the Lever Act gave Presidential authority to license exports pursuant to broad wartime powers over petroleum distribution. Licenses were required as part of the U.S. Fuel Administration’s inaugural planning effort with petroleum.

World War II

During World War II, export matters replaced prewar concerns about imports. The Lend-Lease program featured oil exports to the Allies at taxpayer-subsidized rates.…