“I switched from defense policy to petroleum economics and forecasting because the latter produced a track record that could be judged. And my track record is quite good over the four decades, especially where I have done intensive, data-driven research (as opposed to short-term oil price forecasts, where my record is more mixed).”

“Trying to convince governments, especially oil producing governments, not to expect ever-higher revenues from rising prices has been somewhere close to impossible. Although some officials might want to restrain their fellows, the politicians usually convinced themselves that the goose would never stop laying golden eggs in ever-increasing numbers.”

Q. First, congratulations on the publication of your new book, The “Peak Oil” Scare and the Coming Oil Flood (Praeger). It is a tome, a real takedown, of the fixity-depletion view of petroleum and the activist movement behind it.…

“[T]here is growing evidence of much smaller climate sensitivity to CO2; and even if these drastic emissions reductions occurred, we see little impact on the climate in the 21st century (even if you believe the climate models).”

“It seems rather futile to make token emissions reductions at substantial cost. Deciding that all this is impractical or infeasible seems like a rational response to me.”

– Judith Curry, “A Roadmap for Meeting Paris Emissions Reduction Goals.” Climate Etc., March 25, 2017.

Numerous posts at MasterResource have summarized the thinking of climate scientist and straight shooter Judith Curry. Bravely, and with intellectual vigor, she has personified the adage: “One plus the truth equals a majority.”

Curry has not only documented the fact that estimations of climate sensitivity to the enhanced greenhouse effect have been coming down, and tie-in’s of climate forcing and extreme weather events remain unproven.…

“Government-orchestrated retail competition in electricity largely failed. With that failure came the return of regulatory-mandated, utility-administered wasteful energy efficiency programs. This time the programs carried the added justification of countering global warming.”

Prior to the oil shocks of the 1970s, energy was just another input in the management of capital, labor and other operating costs. Tradeoffs were made between energy costs and capital spent to increase efficiency. During the natural turnover of capital equipment, energy efficiency improved along with productivity, quality and waste reduction. Effective energy use was a technical matter where efficiency had to make economic sense.

Oil  and  gas  shortages in  the  1970s  were caused  by  government  price controls, but the news media hyped the concept of “running out” of resources. This brought politics into the use of energy, an example of how the problems from government intervention can breed more intervention.…

“It is no coincidence that a breakthrough in unconventional hydrocarbons (i.e., shale oil, shale gas, oil sands, and coalbed methane) should have taken place in some of the most economically free countries of the world, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. The combination of secure property rights, transparent and efficient regulation, a favorable tax regime, and minimal red tape made it possible.”

“One of the main obstacles to economic growth and social development in many resource economies is rent-seeking. It is not a unique feature of resource economies, but it does appear to have a particularly strong effect on them and to produce institutional weaknesses.”

– Peter Kaznacheev, Curse or Blessing? How Institutions Determine Success in Resource-Rich Economies, Cato Policy Analysis No. 808 (January 11, 2017)

This new study by Peter Kaznacheev, who is Senior Research Fellow at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) in Moscow, valuably interprets mineral resource theory in light of institutions (read: market versus government control).…